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Introduction
Protecting databases that contain sensitive information has become increasingly important due to its crucial practical applications, such as the disclosure of sensitive health data. Privacy preservation plays a key role in this setting since such data is often published in anonymized form so it can be used by analysts and researchers. Several mechanisms have been proposed, such as differential privacy, that allow for learning from a database while preserving privacy guarantees ( [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] ). At the other extreme are many results showing how database privacy can be compromised by an adversary who is able to collect perturbated answers to a large number of queries regarding the database ( [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] ). Existing results related to breaking the privacy of a database have several key limitations. For example, most assume that each query is represented by a vector q of D independent entries taken from some fixed distribution (such as the Gaussian distribution or a specific discrete distribution), and that this structure is known to the privacy-breaking algorithm. Also, most methods learn an approximation of the unknown database-vector w * that has L 2 error ǫD for some small constant ǫ > 0. Such precision is not sufficient to obtain o(1)-error on the stream of T queries for T ≫ D, as is the case in our model. Further, the focus has typically been on the offline setting, where the adversary first collects all the queries, then applies some privacy-breaking algorithm, and finally uses the reconstructed database-vector to compute good approximations of the statistics he needs. From the machine learning point of view this means that the overall protocol for the adversary consists of two distinct phases: a training phase and a testing phase. Finally, the memory resources used by privacy-breaking algorithms are typically not analyzed, even though this is a crucial issue for the setting considered here, where the number of all the queries q coming in the stream may be huge.
The goal of this paper is to present and analyze a database privacy-breaking algorithm for a more realistic setting in which the limitations described above are lifted. The entries of the query-vector are not necessarily independent. The distribution D of the query-vector is not known to the adversary. The adversary is not able to first learn the database-vector before being evaluated. Our algorithm uses only O(log(T ))-size memory to process the entire stream of T queries and therefore is well-suited to the limited resources scenario. To make life of the adversary even more difficult, we assume that the database mechanism provides only a binary oracle O that answers whether the perturbated value of a dotproduct between the database-vector w * and the query-vector q is greater than a threshold that is specified by the adversary. Thus the algorithm has very limited access to the database even in the noiseless scenario. Dot-products between query-vector and a database-vector are considered in most of the settings analyzing database privacy-breaking algorithms. Considering this more challenging setting, we will show that much less than the noisy answer is needed to carry out an effective attack and compromise data privacy.
In some of the mentioned papers an effort is made to learn a good approximation of the database vector with a small number of queries that is only linear in the size of the database D. We use many more queries but our task is more challenging -we need much more accurate approximation, and get the information only about the sign of the perturbated product as opposed to the perturbated product itself. Finally, we are penalized whenever we are making a mistake. Our goal is to minimize the average error of the algorithm over a long sequence of queries so we need to learn this more accurate approximation very fast.
In this paper we present the first online algorithm that an adversary can use to reconstruct a noisy statistical database protected by a binary oracle O that achieves average errorÕ(
) on the stream of T queries and operates in logarithmic memory. From now on we will call this algorithm a learning algorithm. The learning algorithm is given a set of queries taken from some unknown distribution D defined on a neighborhood of the low-dimensional manifold that it needs to answer in the order that they arrive (note that the entries of a fixed query do not have to be independent). The learning algorithm can use the information learned from previously collected queries but cannot wait for other queries to learn a more accurate answer. Every received query can be used only once to communicate with a database. The database mechanism calculates a perturbated answer to the query and passes the result to the binary oracle O. The binary oracle uses the threshold provided by the adversary and passes a "Yes/No"-answer to him. The error made for a single query is defined as: |z t −w * ·q t |, where q t and z t are the query and answer, respectively, provided by the learning algorithm in round t. As a byproduct of our methods, we recover with high precision the projection of the database-vector w * onto the query-space. Our approximation is withinÕ(
) L 2 -distance from the exact projection. By comparison, most of the previous papers focused on approximating/recovering all but at most a constant fraction ǫD of all the entries of w * which is unacceptably inaccurate in our learning setting where T ≫ D. The assumption that queries are taken from a low-dimensional manifold is in perfect agreement with recent development in machine learning (see: [11] , [12] , [13] ). It leads to the conclusion that, as stated in [11] : "a lot of data which superficially lie in a very high-dimensional space R D actually have low intristic dimensionality, in the sense of lying close to a manifold of dimension d ≪ D". Assume that the queries are taken from a truly high-dimensional space. Then as long as the number of all queries is polynomial in D, the average distances between them are substantial. In this scenario any nontrivial noisy setting prevents the adversary from learning anything about the database since a single perturbated answer does not give much information and the probability that a close enough query will be asked in the future is negligible in D. In practice we observe however that noise can be very often filtered out and a significant number of queries can give nontrivial information about a databasevector w * . In this paper we explain this phenomenon from the theoretical point of view. Our algorithm accurately reconstructs the part of the database that regards the lower-dimensional space used for querying. We show that this suffices to achieve averageÕ(
)-error on the set of T given queries. In our model, the number of queries significantly exceeds the dimensionality of the database, and therefore we focus on optimizing our algorithm's time complexity and accuracy as a function of T . Having said that, in most of the formulas derived in the paper we will also explicitly give the dependence on other parameters of the model such as the dimensionality of the database D and the dimensionality of the query-space d. We are mainly interested in the setting: d ≪ D ≪ T . If we use the O-notation, where the dependency is not explicitly given then we treat all missing parameters as constants.
It should be also emphasized that, contrary to most previous work on reconstructing databases based on the perturbated statistics, the proposed algorithm does not use linear programming and thus gives better theoretical guarantees regarding running time than most existing methods. The algorithm uses a sub-routine whose goal is to solve a linear program, however we show this program has a closed-form solution. Therefore we do not need to use any techniques such as simplex or the ellipsoid method. The algorithm is very fast: it needs only O(dD)-time per query. More detailed analysis of the running time of the algorithm as well as memory usage will be given in the Appendix.
Model description and main result
We will now describe in detail our database access model. We assume that the database can be encoded by the database-vector w * ∈ R D . For definiteness we will consider: w * i ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, . . . , D. Our method can be however used in the much more general setting, as long as w * is taken from some fixed ball in L ∞ . Each query can be represented as a vector q = (q 1 , . . . , q D ), where: 0 ≤ q i ≤ 1 and q
Queries are taken independently at random from the unknown distribution D (notice that entries of a fixed query do not have to be independent). The distribution D is defined on some d-dimensional
The exact answer to the query is given as 
is then given to L. The learner records this value and can also use the information obtained from previously received queries to give an answer z t to the query q t . However it has only O(log(T ))-memory available. Further, for a fixed query the learner only has one-time access to the binary oracle O.
The noise ǫ t =ã t −a t is generated independently at random and is of the form DE, where E is some known distribution producing values from some bounded range [−u, u] . The boundedness assumption is not crucial. Technically speaking, as long as the random variable is not heavy-tailed (which is a standard assumption), our approach works. In fact even this condition is unnecessarily strong. This will become obvious later when we describe and analyze our method.
This setting covers standard scenarios where computing every single product in the sum of d terms for w * · q t gives an independent bounded error. We should notice here that in most of the previous papers the magnitude of the noise added was of the order o( √ D) (see: [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] ). For instance, in [7] the authors reconstruct a database that agrees with the groundtruth one on all but (2cα) 2 entries, where α is a noise magnitude and c > 0 is a constant. Thus, even though previous works do not assume that noise was added independently for every query, the average error per single product in the dot-product sum was only of the magnitude o(
). This assumption significantly narrows the range of possible applications. This is no longer the case in our setting, where some mild and reasonable assumptions regarding independence of noise added to different queries and low-dimensionality of querying space leads to a model much more robust to noise. We will assume that ǫ t do not have singularities, i.e. P(ǫ t = c) = 0 for any fixed c.
We need a few more definitions.
Definition 1.
We say that a vector w computed by the learning algorithm ǫ-
Definition 2. Let Q be a probability distribution on the unit sphere S(0, 1) in L 2 . For a fixed vector q ∈ S(0, 1) we denote by p Q q,θ the probability that a vector x selected according to Q satisfies: q · x ≥ cos(θ). The error ǫ q the algorithm is making on each query q is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the exact answer to the query and the answer that is provided by the algorithm. The average error on the set of queries: 
with probability
), where r = ).
We will give this algorithm, called OnlineBisection algorithm, in the next section. Notice that φ is well approximated by
. To see what the magnitude of r is in the worst-case scenario it suffices to analyze the setting where q is chosen uniformly at random from the query-space U.
If this is the case then one can notice that p D,φ is of the order
If however there exists a basis of U such that most of the mass of D is concentrated around vectors from the basis then standard analysis leads to the Theorem 1 implies a corollary regarding the batch version of the algorithm, where test and training set are clearly separated (the proof of that corollary will be given in the Appendix): Corollary 1. Let w T denote the final hypothesis constructed by the OnlineBisection algorithm after consuming T queries drawn from an unknown distribution D. Then the following inequality holds with probability at least
for any future queries q drawn from D:
In the subsequent sections we will prove Theorem 1 and conduct further analysis of the algorithm. Unless stated otherwise, log denotes the natural logarithm. ).
if ∃i * ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that arccos(e i * ,
The Algorithm
We will now present an algorithm (Algorithm 1) that achieves theoretical guarantees from Theorem 1. Our algorithm, called OnlineBisection, maintains a tuple of intervals (I 1 , . . . , I d ) which encode a hypercube that contains the databasevector w * (projected onto U) with very high probability. For each coming queryvector q t the algorithm outputs an answer w approx · q t , where w approx is an arbitrarily selected vector in the current hypercube. The query-vectors received by the algorithm are used to progressively shrink the hypercube.
As the hypercube shrinks, vector w approx ǫ-approximates w * for smaller values of ǫ. When the hypercube is large the errors made by the algorithm will be large, but on the other hand larger hypercubes are easier to shrink since they require fewer queries to ensure that hypercube continues to contain w * (with very high probability) after shrinking. This observation plays a crucial role in establishing upper bounds on the average error made by the algorithm on the sequence of T queries.
After outputting an answer for query-vector q t , the algorithm checks whether q t has a large inner product with at least one vector in an orthonormal basis C = {e 1 , . . . , e d } of U. If so, q t represents an observation for that basis vector; whether it is a positive or negative observation depends on the response of the binary oracle O. The threshold given by the algorithm to O is chosen by solving the linear program max y∈HC q ·y for q = q t and q = −q t , where HC is the current hypercube. As we will see in Section A, this linear program is simple enough that there is a closed-form expression for its optimal value. So we do not need to use the simplex method or any other linear programming tools.
Algorithm 2 -ShrinkHyperCube
Input:
) and
The optimal values m and M of the linear programs solved by the OnlineBisection algorithm represent the smallest and largest possible value of the inner product of the query-vector and a vector from the current hypercube. The true value lies in the interval [m, M ]. By choosing the average of these two values as a threshold for the oracle we are able to effectively shrink direction i * . The intuition is that if the query-vector forms an angle α = 0 with this direction and there is no noise added then by choosing the average we basically perform standard binary search for q. Since α is not necessarily 0 but is relatively small (and noise is added that perturbates the output), the search is not exactly binary.
Instead of two disjoint subintervals of I i * we get two intervals whose union is I i * but that intersect. Still, each of them is only of a fraction of the length of I i * and that still enables us to significantly shrink each dimension whenever a sufficient number of observations have been collected for each basis vector -specifically, N crit observations -by calling the ShrinkHyperCube subroutine (Algorithm 2).
Every shrinking of the hypercube decreases each edge by a factor α for some 0 < α < 1. A logarithmic number of shrinkings is needed to ensure that any choice of w approx in the hypercube will give an error of the orderÕ(
). Notice that N crit grows with T , which reflects the fact that for smaller hypercubes more observations are needed to further shrink the hypercube while preserving the property that it contains the database-vector w * with very high probability. This is the case since if the hypercube is small we already know a good approximation of the database vector so it is harder to find even more accurate one under the same level of noise. When the hypercube is small enough (condition:
) there is no need to shrink it anymore since each vector taken from the hypercube is a precise enough estimate of the database vector. Note that choosing an orthonormal basis C = {e 1 , . . . , e d } of U does not require the knowledge of the distribution D from which queries are taken. We only assume that queries are from a low-dimensional linear subspace U of d dimensions. It suffices to have as {e 1 , . . . , e d } some orthonormal basis of that linear subspace. There are many state-of-the-art mechanisms (such as PCA) that are able to extract such a basis, and thus we will not focus on that, but instead assume that such an orthonormal system is already given. Notice that in practice those techniques should be applied before our algorithm can be run. Since such a preprocessing phase requires sampling from D but does not require an access to the database system, we can think about it as a preliminary period, where evaluation is not being conducted.
Theoretical analysis
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We start by introducing several technical lemmas. Their proofs will be given in the Appendix. We prove here how those lemmas can be combined to obtain our main result.
We denote: h T = √ T log(T ) . Thus the stopping condition for shrinking the hypercube is of the form:
. We start with the standard concentration result regarding binomial random variables. 
Then the following is true:
for some constant 0 < ǫ ≤ 
).
In the following lemma we analyze cutting the hypercube according to some linear threshold.
Let z be a unit-length vector satisfying:
z · e ≥ cos(θ) for some 0 < θ < π 2 . Let 0 < β < 1. Define m = min y∈HC y · z and M = max y∈HC y · z. Let HC l = {y ∈ HC : z · y ≤ m + β(M − m)} and HC r = {y ∈ HC : z · y > m + β(M − m)}. Then for ǫ = 8 sin(
and
We are ready to prove Theorem 1 assuming that presented lemmas are true.
Let us notice that the algorithm can be divided into s + 1 phases, where in the i th phase (i = 0, . . . , s) all the intervals I i are of length Lα −i and s =
. Indeed, whenever the shrinking is conducted, the length of each side of the hypercube decreases by a factor . We will call those phases: 1st-phase, 2nd-phase, etc. Notice also that the value of the parameter N crit is constant across a fixed phase since this number changes only when ShrinkHyperCube subroutine is performed. Let us denote the value of N crit during the i th phase of the algorithm as n i . Notice that n i = 30 log(T )
, where ∆p i is the value of the parameter ∆p of the algorithm used in the i th phase. Denote by k i the number of queries that need to be processed in the i th phase for i = 0, . . . , s−1. Parameter k i is a random variable but we will show later that with high probability: k i ≤ n i r for i = 0, . . . , s − 1, where: r = 2 (p D,φ ) 2 . Assume now that this is the case. Denote by HC 0 , . . . , HC s the sequence of hypercubes constructed by the algorithm. Assume furthermore that w * ∈ HC 0 ∩ · · · ∩ HC s . Again, we have not proved it yet, we will show that this happens with high probability later. However we will prove now that under these two assumptions we get the average error proposed in the statement of Theorem 1. Notice that under these assumptions we can use Lemma 2 with
We get the following bound on the cumulative error:
Thus the average error is at most ǫ av ≤ ǫcum T . By using the expression h(T ) = log(T ) √ T in the above formula, we obtain the bound from the statement of Theorem 1.
It remains to prove that our two assumptions are correct with high probability and find a lower bound on this probability that matches the one from the statement of the theorem. We will do it now. Let us focus on the i th phase of the algorithm. First we will find an upper bound on the probability that the number of queries processed in this phase is greater than k i . Fix a vector e j from the orthonormal basis C. The probability that a new query q is within angle φ from e j is at least p = p D,φ , by the definition of p D,φ . Assume that u i queries were constructed. By standard concentration inequalities, such as Azuma's inequality, we can conclude that with probability at least 1 − e −2ui( 2 at least n i of those queries will be within angle φ from e j . Denote u i = n i r, where r > 2 p . We see that the considered probability is at least 1 − e − p 2 2 nir . Using the expression on n i we get that this probability is at least 1 − e −30r p 2 2 log(T ) . Notice that when n i queries within angle φ from a given vector e j ∈ C are collected, the j th dimension is ready for shrinking. Thus taking union bound over O(log(dT )) phases and all d dimensions we see that if we take k i = rn i , where: r = 2 p 2 , then with probability at most
some i th phase of the algorithm for i ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1} will require more than k i queries. Now let us focus again on the fixed i th phase of the algorithm. Assume that ShrinkHyperCube subroutine is being run. Fix some dimension j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. We know that, with high probability, at least n i queries q that were within angle φ from the vector e j ∈ C were collected. Denote by w * j the j th coordinate of w * . Let I j = [x j , y j ] and assume that w * j ∈ [x j , y j ]. Let us assume that the ShrinkHyperCube subroutine replaced I j = [x j , y j ] bỹ I j . We want to show that with high probability segmentĨ j is constructed in such a way that w * j ∈Ĩ j . Denote l = y j − x j and δ = (α − 1 2 )l. Notice first that if w * j ∈ [(1 − α)l, αl] then w * j will be inĨ j since no matter howĨ j is constructed, it always contains [(1 − α)l, αl]. So let us assume that this is not the case. Thus we have either w *
Let us assume first the former. Consider a query-vector q within angle φ of e j that contributed to N + j . Let us denote by p + the probability of the following event F q : for q the oracle O gives answer: "greater than 0". Observe that the total error made by the database mechanism M while computing the dotproduct: w * · q is DE. Now notice, that by Lemma 3 and the definition of E, probability p + is at most P(DE > δ − ǫl), where: ǫ = 8 sin(
). Notice that in the i th phase the hypercube under consideration has the side of length exactly α i . Thus, since α = 3 4 , we get:
We proceed with the similar analysis as before. We see that the probability P + of an event F q is at least P(DE ≥ −δ + ǫl). Thus we obtain:
But now we see, by Lemma 1, using: 
is satisfied if
] with probability at most e . We can use Lemma 1 since (as it is easy to notice) in the i th phase ∆p is exactly ∆p i = P(−
) and p 1 is exactly
. We obtain the following: the probability that there exists i such that w * / ∈ HC 0 ∩ · · · ∩ HC i is at most: O(
). Substituting in that expression the formula on n i , and noticing that the number of all the phases of the algorithm is logarithmic in T , D and d, we get the bound O(
). Thus, according to our previous remarks, we conclude that with probability at least 1 − O(
) OnlineBisection algorithm makes an average error at most:
As mentioned before, we complete the proof by using the formula: h T = √ T log(T ) .
Conclusions
We presented in this paper the firstÕ(
)-error algorithm for database reconstuction in the online setting, using logarithmic memory and O(dD)-time per query. It is designed for the highly challenging, yet very realistic setting, where the answers given by the database are heavily perturbated by a random noise and there exists a strong privacy mechanism (binary oracle O) that aims to protect the database against an adversary attempting to compromise it. We show that even if the learning algorithm receives only binary answers on the database side and needs to learn database-vector w * with high precision at the same time it is being evaluated, it can still achieve very small average error. We assume that the query-space is low-dimensional but this fact is needed only to guarantee that the term r = The low-dimensionality assumption is indispensable here if one wants to achieve average error of the order o(1) in a nontrivial setting with random noise. OnlineBisection algorithm adapts next threshold values sent to the binary oracle O to its previous answers in order to obtain good approximation of the projection of a database-vector w * onto a low-dimensional query-space U.
A Analysis of the running time of the algorithm and memory usage
We start with the analysis of the running time of OnlineBisection. First we will show that the linear program used by the algorithm to determine the threshold in each round has a closed form solution. x j e j · q where J + = {i ∈ {1, . . . , d} : e i · q ≥ 0} and J − = {i ∈ {1, . . . , d} : e i · q < 0}.
Proof. Take some point: c 1 e 1 + · · · + c d e d , where: x i ≤ c i ≤ y i for i = 1, . . . , d. For j ∈ J + the following is true: c j e j · q ≤ y j e j · q, since: c j ≤ y j and e j · q ≥ 0. Similarly, for j ∈ J − we have: c j e j · q ≤ x j e j · q, again by the definition of J − . Combining these inequalities we get that for every point v in the hypercube HC induced by I 1 , . . . , I d and C the following is true: v · q ≤ opt. Besides clearly there exists v * ∈ HC such that: v * · q = opt. Using these values of δ 1 and δ 2 , we obtain: P(Z m ≥ µ 1 + 
D Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Denote: η = e − z. Note that η 2 ≤ 2 sin(
